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Recent Cases
CONTRACTS-BIGHT OF MATEIALMEN TO RECOVER AS Tmi-D PARTY BENE-
FICIARIES ON SUBCONTRACrOR'S SuRETY BoND-The United States Gov-
ernment, in awarding a building contract to a contractor, required him
as the prime contractor to execute a payment bond pursuant to the
provisions of the Miller Act.' The Miller Act provides that every
materialman who has furnished labor or material under a government
contract and who has not been paid shall have a right to sue on the
prime contractor's payment bond for the balance due, provided he
has given the prime contractor written notice of default within ninety
days from the date he performed the last labor or furnished the last
material. The prime contractor, realizing the liability imposed upon
him by the Miller Act, required his subcontractor to furnish him with
a payment bond so that if the subcontractor failed to pay his material-
men, the contractor would be indemnified. Upon default of the sub-
contractor, the materialmen failed to give the contractor the required
notice as provided for in the Miller Act and as a result were barred
from bringing an action on the prime contractor's payment bond.
Having no action on the prime contractor's payment bond because of
failure of notice, the materialmen then brought this action to recover
on the subcontractor's payment bond as third party beneficiaries. The
conditions of the subcontractor's payment bond included not only
indemnification of the contractor but also payment by the subcon-
tractor of all labor and material obligations. The United States District
Court applying the "intent to benefit" test granted a motion to dismiss
the action against the subcontractor's surety company holding that
the motive of the contractor in requiring the bond was to protect him-
self, and not to protect the subcontractor's materialmen. Held: Re-
versed and remanded. It was wholly irrelevant for the trial judge to
speculate as to the motive of the parties to the bond. The true test is
whether in the payment bond the surety promised to pay money to
the materialmen. By this simple test, the defendant was plainly
obligated to pay "material obligations" such as that sued on. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Company v. Continental Casualty Company, 219 F. 2d
645 (CA2 1955).
The problem presented involves selection of the proper test to be
applied in determining whether labor and materialmen are protected
140 U.S.C.A. sec. 270(a) (1935).
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third party beneficiaries under a surety bond executed by a subcon-
tractor as required by his prime contractor. The Restatement of Con-
tracts defines protected third party beneficiaries as follows:
(1) Where performance of a promise in a contract will
benefit a person other than the promisee, that person is ... :
(a) a donee beneficiary if it appears from the terms of the
promise in view of the accompanying circumstances that the
purpose of the promisee in obtaining the promise of all or
part of the performance thereof is to make a gift to the
beneficiary or to confer upon him a right against the promisor
to some performance neither due nor supposed or asserted
to be due from the promisee to the beneficiary;
(b) a creditor beneficiary if no purpose to make a gift appears
from the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying
circumstances and performance of the promise will satisfy
an actual or supposed or asserted duty of the promisee to
the beneficiary ... 2
Under this definition of protected third party beneficiaries, do the
materialmen in this case come within the category of either a donee
or creditor beneficiary? The effect of the Miller Act is to impose upon
the prime contractor a personal obligation to the subcontractor's
materialmen, on condition that if they are not paid by the subcon-
tractor, they can bring an action on the prime contractor's payment
bond. Since under the Miller Act the prime contractor has this obliga-
tion to the subcontractor's materialmen, it follows that under the Re-
statement's definition the materialmen are creditor beneficiaries.
3
While it is clear under the Restatements definition that the sub-
contractor's materialmen are creditor beneficiaries in the contractor-
subcontractor cases governed by the Miller Act, this simple solution
is not reflected in the cases. Generally, the courts have attempted to
apply the "intent to benefit" test based on a determination of the object
or purpose in securing the bond.4 This has resulted in confusion in
this type of case. For example, in McGrath v. American Surety Com-
pany,5 a case identical on its facts to Socony-Vacuum, the New York
Court in denying recovery held that the object of the payment bond
was only to indemnify the prime contractor against payments which
he might be required by the Miller Act to make to materialmen of the
subcontractor. Since the Miller Act imposed a personal obligation on
2 Restatement, Contracts sec. 133 (1933).
3 The Kentucky Court of Appeals has classified materialmen as creditor
beneficiaries in the contractor-subcontractor cases using the Restatement's defini-
tion. Jackson Lumber Company v. Union Transfer and Storage Company, 246 Ky.
653, 55 S.W. 2d 670 (1932). (Obligation was based on a contract rather than
the Miller Act).
477 A.L.R. 68-71 (1932).
5 307 N.Y. 552, 122 N.E. 2d 906 (1954).
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the contractor, the Court concluded that his purpose was only to
protect himself in requiring the subcontractor to furnish him with a
payment bond and not to protect the subcontractor's materialmen.
One year later, the same Court reached the opposite result in
Daniel-Morris Company v. Glens Falls Indemnity Company.0 Except
for the absence of the Miller Act, the facts were the same as in the
former case. The Court concluded that the primary purpose of the
bond was to benefit the materialmen by making provision for their
payment. The Court also pointed to the existence of a separate per-
formance bond which would provide indemnity to the prime con-
tractor, thus confirming the intent to benefit directly the unpaid
materialmen by the payment bond. The McGrath decision was dis-
tinguished on the ground that in that case the payment bond was not
secured primarily to benefit the materialmen since they were already
afforded full protection by the bond required of the prime contractor
under the Miller Act. Yet in that case as in the Daniel-Morris case, the
terms of the subcontractor's bond contained as one of the conditions
the payment by the subcontractor of its obligations to labor and ma-
terialmen. Thus, from the 'language" of the bond, there was as much
opportunity for the Court in the McGrath case to have found an "in-
tent to benefit" the materialmen as in Daniel-Morris. These two New
York cases illustrate the difficulties presented under the "intent to
benefit" test, especially if an attempt is made to investigate the pri-
mary object or purpose which led to the securing of the bond.
Since the "intent to benefit" test leads to confusion, what test should
be applied to determine if materialmen are protected third party bene-
ficiaries? This question can be answered by examining the opinion
of the Court in the Socony-Vacuum case. The Court adopted the test
suggested by Professor Corbin when, quoting him, it said:
[T]he third party has an enforceable right if the surety promises in
the bond, either in express words or by reasonable implication, to
pay money to him. If there is such a promissory expression as this,
there need be no discussion of 'intention to benefit.'
7
By applying this test, the Court had the task of finding a promise in the
payment bond to pay the materialmen. The Court said:
But since the bond is stated to be on condition that the principal-
here the subcontractor-'shall pay all labor and material obligations',
the words of the condition are the full equivalent of words of direct
promise.8
6 808 N.Y. 464, 126 N.E. 2d 750 (1955).
t Socony-Vacuum Oil Company v. Continental Casualty Company, 219 F. 2d
645 at 647 (CA2 1955).
8 ibid.
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In reaching the conclusion that the materialmen were protected
beneficiaries, the Court refused to recognize the McGrath case, dis-
cussed above, and based their entire decision on Professor Corbin's
views as expressed in his treatise. 9
The latest case found by the writer to present this problem is
Frommeyer v. L. & R. Construction Company.10 The facts are the same
as in Socony-Vacuum, with one exception. In this case the bond was
not conditioned on payment by the subcontractor of all labor and
material obligations. The Court held that the materialmen could not
recover on the subcontractor's payment bond because of the absence
of a promise in the bond to pay materialmen. Thus, this case is not in
conflict with the Socony-Vacuum case, because by applying Professor
Corbin's test, a promise to pay materialmen was not contained in the
payment bond. Professor Corbin says:
Of course, if the surety bond is so worded that the promised per-
formance does not include payment to the plaintiff, but is merely to
protect the promisee against liens, he is not a beneficiary of the con-
tract and has no right."
The Court in this case applied the proper test in denying recovery as
did the Court in the Socony-Vacuum case in allowing recovery.
In summary, the Courts generally have not used the Restatement's
definition, whereby materialmen could be considered as creditor bene-
ficiaries in the contractor-subcontractor cases which are governed by
the Miller Act. Instead, most Courts have used the "intent to benefit"
test which in this type of case has led to confusion. Because under this
test the courts treat the materialmen as incidental beneficiaries in many
of the cases, they have denied recovery to materialmen, concluding
that the contractor's object was to protect himself instead of to make a
gift or confer a right on the materialmen. Since the "intent to benefit"
test has not achieved consistent results in like cases, it is submitted
that the Courts should adopt the test which was used in the Socony-
Vacuum case: "Did the surety promise in the payment bond to pay
money to the materialmen?" If so, recovery should be allowed, as in
the Socony-Vacuum case, regardless of the objects, purposes or motives
of the parties in securing the bond; if not, recovery should be denied,
as was done in the Frommeyer case.
Richard D. Cooper
0 4 Corbin, Contracts sec. 798-802 (1951).
10 139 F. Supp. 579 (DC N.J. 1956).
11 Supra note 9 at 184.
